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Abstract
The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) debate is gaining ground in contemporary evolutionary biology. In parallel, a 
number of philosophical standpoints have emerged in an attempt to clarify what exactly is represented by the EES. For Mas-
simo Pigliucci, we are in the wake of the newest instantiation of a persisting Kuhnian paradigm; in contrast, Telmo Pievani 
has contended that the transition to an EES could be best represented as a progressive reformation of a prior Lakatosian 
scientific research program, with the extension of its Neo-Darwinian core and the addition of a brand-new protective belt 
of assumptions and auxiliary hypotheses. Here, we argue that those philosophical vantage points are not the only ways to 
interpret what current proposals to ‘extend’ the Modern Synthesis-derived ‘standard evolutionary theory’ (SET) entail in 
terms of theoretical change in evolutionary biology. We specifically propose the image of the emergent EES as a vast network 
of models and interweaved representations that, instantiated in diverse practices, are connected and related in multiple ways. 
Under that assumption, the EES could be articulated around a paraconsistent network of evolutionary theories (including 
some elements of the SET), as well as models, practices and representation systems of contemporary evolutionary biology, 
with edges and nodes that change their position and centrality as a consequence of the co-construction and stabilization of 
facts and historical discussions revolving around the epistemic goals of this area of the life sciences. We then critically exam-
ine the purported structure of the EES—published by Laland and collaborators in 2015—in light of our own network-based 
proposal. Finally, we consider which epistemic units of Evo-Devo are present or still missing from the EES, in preparation 
for further analyses of the topic of explanatory integration in this conceptual framework.
Keywords Extended Evolutionary Synthesis · Evolutionary biology · Paradigm · Scientific research program · Epistemic 
units · Evo-Devo
Introduction
The American paleontologist Niles Eldredge, famous co-
proponent of the theory of punctuated equilibrium, recently 
asserted that “(e)volutionary biology is a notoriously diffuse 
field of scientific inquiry” (Eldredge 2008; p. 10). Ten years 
after that statement, the idea seems to hold as the discipline 
comprises a plural landscape of multiple co-existent con-
ceptual frameworks and strenuous voices that disagree on 
the nature and scope of ‘evolutionary theory’ (e.g., Oyama 
1986; West-Eberhard 2003; Kirschner and Gerhart 2005; 
Dieckmann and Doebeli 2005; Lynch 2007; Hoekstra and 
Coyne 2007; Duboule 2010; Laubichler 2010; Wagner 2011; 
Depew and Weber 2011; Nei 2013; Jablonka and Lamb 
2014; Laland et al. 2014, 2015; Futuyma 2015; Pavličev and 
Wagner 2015; Jaeger et al. 2015; Pievani 2016a; Eldredge 
et al. 2016; Welch 2017; Charlesworth et al. 2017). Within 
this plural landscape, a public debate is gaining ground (see 
Laland et al. 2014): whether a ‘new’ conceptual framework, 
i.e., the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES), is needed 
to extend or go beyond the boundaries and explanatory 
power of the Standard Evolutionary Theory (SET), the pur-
ported direct heir of the Modern Synthesis (MS; in contrast, 
see Stoltzfus 2017).
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This idea is not precisely novel (it is present, for example, 
in Waddington 1969; Gould 1980; Stanley 1981; Bonner 
1982; Eldredge 1985; Wicken 1987; Endler and McLellan 
1988): throughout the twentieth-century, numerous calls for 
a ‘New Synthesis’ came from diverse, manifold, and—in 
some cases—unrelated paleontological and neontological 
trenches [see Depew and Weber 2013 for a brief overview; 
see also Callebaut 2010 and Peterson 2016; for a discus-
sion about Niles Eldredge’s ‘Hierarchy Theory of Evolution’ 
(HTE), a previous attempt to extend the MS from palaeon-
tological grounds and the study of macroevolution, in rela-
tion to the concepts and themes espoused in the EES, see 
Fábregas-Tejeda and Vergara-Silva 2018]. But this time, the 
framework known as EES1 portrays itself in a different light 
with a far-reaching purview to counteract the explanatory 
shortcomings of the SET (Laland et al. 2014, 2015). The 
‘intellectual movement’ that publicly started as a published 
article in the journal Evolution authored by the Italian-
American evolutionary biologist and philosopher Massimo 
Pigliucci—in 2007, where the term ‘Extended Evolutionary 
Synthesis’ was coined—soon led to a workshop organized 
by Gerd B. Müller and Pigliucci at the Konrad Lorenz Insti-
tute for Evolution and Cognition Research (Klosterneuburg, 
Austria), out of which a (now widely discussed) volume 
arose (see Pigliucci and Müller 2010a). These events were 
followed by the publication of several articles (e.g., Craig 
2010; Noble et al. 2014; Laland et al. 2014; Pigliucci and 
Finkelman 2014; Noble 2015; Laland et al. 2015; Pievani 
2016b) and the organization of a number of scientific meet-
ings dealing with the contours, limitations, challenges and 
philosophical debates raised by the so-called EES. So far, 
the EES has exhibited a constellation of social features not 
seen before in other calls to extend the MS and/or the SET, 
mainly reflected in considerable institutional and financial 
support—for instance, the award of an important grant pro-
vided by the John Templeton Foundation in 2016 to a group 
of international scholars, led by Kevin Laland (University 
of St Andrews) and Tobias Uller (Lund University), to ‘put 
the predictions of the EES to the test’ (see, e.g., http://syner 
gy.st-andre ws.ac.uk/ees/the-proje ct/; http://exten dedev oluti 
onary synth esis.com/the-proje ct/summa ry-of-our-resea rch/). 
Further interdisciplinary projects, press attention (e.g., Pen-
nisi 2016, 2008; Whitfield 2008; Grant 2010; Zimmer 2016; 
Kiger 2016) and the involvement of a large group of evolu-
tionary biologists, philosophers of science and social scien-
tists from a wide-range of academic backgrounds that share 
explanatory goals and agendas (see http://exten dedev oluti 
onary synth esis.com/peopl e/) strengthen this picture, at the 
same time epistemological and sociological.
Nevertheless, lingering philosophical questions remain for 
historians and philosophers of biology to address: What is the 
nature of the ongoing change and what type of conceptual 
architectures are to be expected from the EES? What exactly 
does the EES ‘stand for,’ and what would be entailed by 
resignifications of concepts already defined in/by the SET? 
In this article, we will outline the different philosophical 
proposals that have emerged so far as attempts to concep-
tualize the emerging structure of the EES and its position 
and significance within contemporary evolutionary biology. 
Here, we should acknowledge that the evaluation of the merit, 
utility or intellectual contribution of the variety of models 
combined under the label of the EES is an important subject 
that nevertheless lies beyond the scope of this article. That 
discussion is being actively held between scientists defending 
that standpoint (e.g., Laland et al. 2015; Müller 2017) and 
their opponents (e.g., Welch 2017; Futuyma 2017), which 
includes assessments of specific aspects of the EES (e.g., a 
critical appraisal of the notion of ‘reciprocal causation’ in 
the EES is presented by Svensson 2018). After recounting 
the philosophical proposals that have been propounded to 
conceptualize the emerging structure of the EES, we will 
put forward an alternative interpretation and further discuss 
the topic of explanatory integration in this conceptual frame-
work, focusing on evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-
Devo sensu Müller 2007a) as a case study. The last point 
should be considered preliminary, though, pending analysis 
in the context of recent proposals of a ‘theory of theory inte-
gration’ (see Laubichler et al. 2018) which have paid special 
attention to evolutionary biology-related concepts and issues. 
We will begin with Massimo Pigliucci’s personal account and 
philosophical standpoint about the EES.
The ‘Extended Evolutionary Synthesis’ (EES): 
what is the nature of the ongoing change 
and what type of conceptual architectures 
are to be expected?
A common held idea within the minds of natural scientists, 
although severely criticized by historians and philosophers 
of science, is that theoretical syntheses not only have been 
1 Before moving forward, we point out that our discussion will be 
centered mainly around the ideas and concepts espoused in the book 
edited by Pigliucci and Müller (2010a, b) and in Laland et al. (2015), 
which constitute the mainstream usage of the framework dubbed 
‘Extended Evolutionary Synthesis,’ but we recognize that many other 
authors in recent years have proposed diverse views as to how to 
‘extend’ (or ‘expand’) the current evolutionary synthesis (e.g. Gould 
2002; Kutschera and Niklas 2004; Brooks 2011 and citations therein; 
Tëmkin and Eldredge 2015 for an updated version of the ‘Hierarchy 
Theory of Evolution’ (HTE) that incorporates network analysis; see 
also Pievani 2016a; Eldredge et  al. 2016). In the literature focused 
on the integration of non-genetic heritable variation into wider evo-
lutionary frameworks, somewhat interchangeable terms to refer to 
some of the themes and motifs of the EES are being used, e.g. ‘Inclu-
sive Evolutionary Synthesis’ (Danchin 2013) or ‘Pluralistic Model of 
Inheritance’ (Bonduriansky 2012). Differences are more explicit in 
Bonduriansky and Day (2018).
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accomplished throughout the complex histories of their par-
ticular disciplines, but also represent the paragon of some-
thing desirable and worth-pursuing in the future (Casanueva 
and Martínez 2014), i.e., the embodiment of a ‘rational suc-
cess’ (see, for instance, Sidlauskas et al. 2010). For models 
of continuous scientific change, the cases of intertheoretic 
reduction or assimilation with mild corrections receive posi-
tive assessments because, by subsuming previous achieve-
ments under novel, wider frameworks, science can develop 
by successive augmentations and unifications (Casanueva 
and Martínez 2014). This is the mindset glanced in Mas-
simo Pigliucci’s account of the conceptual history—and 
uninterrupted expansion of the conceptual repertoire—of 
‘evolutionary theory’, from Darwinism to the recent discus-
sions and reevaluations put forth by the EES (see Pigliucci 
2009). In that article, Pigliucci embraced a position that we 
call ‘unicity of evolutionary thought’: for him, evolution-
ary biology is composed of a single conceptual framework 
cemented by the ideas of Charles Robert Darwin and Alfred 
Russell Wallace that has been modified, refined, expanded 
and assembled in a step-wise manner during historically 
important instantiations (i.e., ‘Neo-Darwinism,’ ‘Modern 
Synthesis’ and ‘Extended Evolutionary Synthesis’), rep-
resented as a nested set of ellipses in Pigliucci’s original 
diagram.2 In his own words: “(…) evolutionary biology has 
not undergone a paradigm shift since Darwin and Wallace’s 
work” (Pigliucci 2009; p. 219; a key viewpoint also under-
scored in Pigliucci 2007). By explicitly embracing Kuhnian 
notions, Pigliucci argues that evolutionary biologists have 
reacted to various minor crises by means of augmenting 
the preexisting framework, constructing new floors in their 
robust structure, without shaking or undermining its Dar-
winian foundations (Pigliucci 2007). Likewise, in recent 
times Pigliucci has stated that no methodological, observa-
tional or semantic incommensurability exists between the 
EES and the ‘Darwinian Paradigm’ (see the talk ‘Extended 
Evolutionary Synthesis and paradigm shifts’ available at 
his website https ://plato footn ote.wordp ress.com/talks /; see 
also Pigliucci 2018). According to this view, contemporary 
evolutionary biology (and the EES debate within it) is seen 
as an unscathed edifice of puzzle-solving ‘normal science’. 
Hence, in our interpretation, Pigliucci’s answer to the ques-
tion posed earlier is that we are in the wake of the newest 
instantiation of a persisting Kuhnian paradigm.
This vantage point, in its extreme form, grants that there 
is but ‘one Theory of Evolution’ in the twenty-first century, 
bequeathed by the sustained efforts of multiple scientists, 
whose conceptual contributions can be, in principle, aligned 
with unbroken historical continuity. Veiled in this alleged 
consecutive advancement of ‘evolutionary theory’ could lie 
an unrecognized projection of how things ought to unfold 
in the future. Citing the last sentence of Pigliucci’s 2009 
article: “Because of the very nature of science, there is no 
pretense at all that the third ellipse will be the end of the 
story”; mirroring the past, new instantiations of ‘evolution-
ary theory’ will be defined and delimited in the horizon of 
future ideas, phenomena to be studied and fields of inquiry, 
suggesting an endless spiral—progressive but perfectible—
of conceptual expansion (see Fig. 1). However, this is an 
over-simplistic view of the history, present state and future 
projections of evolutionary biology as a scientific disci-
pline (see also Delisle 2018; p. 158): history cannot be used 
to accurately predict the future (see Gaddis 2002) and, as 
robust historiography of science shows, scientific knowledge 
does not accumulate in a linear and progressive fashion (e.g., 
Raj 2013; for a contextualized example in the history of 
evolutionary biology, see Amundson 2005).3 
At the same time, many historians and philosophers 
would disagree with the portrayal of ‘persisting paradigm’ 
that Pigliucci ascribes to evolutionary biology—first of all, 
as has been argued many times, Kuhnian notions such as 
‘paradigm’ or ‘exemplar’ prove to be flawed, or at least very 
difficult to apply, for the case of biology (see, e.g., Lew-
ens 2016; Peterson 2016). Philosophers of biology such as 
Telmo Pievani (2012) openly disagree with the characteriza-
tion of current evolutionary theory as a Kuhnian paradigm 
on the grounds that no serious anomalies have accrued in 
the last century, and that there is no tangible ‘dogmatic 
crystallization’ or ‘hardening’ that announces a major crisis 
and a subsequent paradigm shift. Instead, Pievani (2012, 
2016a) argues that is commonplace in the field of evolu-
tionary biology to solve and understand new problems and 
apparent exceptions mainly through integrative explanations, 
fine adjustments of the breadth of application of established 
forms of explanation to distinct empirical domains, novel 
2 The visual tradition for depicting the EES as a nested set of ellipses 
(a Venn diagram), initiated by Pigliucci (2009), has been influential 
for many evolutionary biologists and philosophers. For example, tak-
ing Pigliucci´s diagram as a starting point, the British physiologist 
Denis Noble recently published his take on the contours of the EES 
(Noble 2015), for him dubbed ‘Integrative Synthesis’ as it would be 
based on the integration of a variety of interacting mechanisms of 
evolutionary change; he sees it as “a nuanced multi mechanism the-
ory of evolution” (Noble 2015; p. 7). The differences between the two 
diagrams are conspicuous: at variance with Pigliucci, Noble does not 
portray the ‘new synthesis’ as a perfectly continuous extension of the 
MS: several elements of its gene-centric stance will be left out, being 
replaced by wider views of inheritance, multilevel selection and a 
different view of genomic evolution. Instead of using a nested set of 
enlarging ellipses, Noble depicts the EES as a set of partially overlap-
ping ellipses (with elements of the MS not in contact with the ele-
ments of the purported EES).
3 It should be mentioned that Pigliucci’s stance on the current junc-
ture and the future of evolutionary thought has become more nuanced 
in recent years (see Pigliucci and Finkelman 2014; Pigliucci 2018).
 Theory in Biosciences
1 3
calculations of the relative frequency of occurrence of evo-
lutionary patterns, and by means of updating the evolution-
ist’s theoretical tool-kit and plodding along experimental 
novelties. That means that “(…) the dynamics of growth 
and evolution of the theory is based on processes of theo-
retical extension and empirical enlargement of an elastic 
set of explanations already consolidated but constantly 
needing adjustments and integrations” (Pievani 2012; p. 
214). Furthermore, for this author the notion of a ‘scientific 
research program’ (SRP; sensu Lakatos 1978) best captures 
the intricacies of the non-static set of articulated explana-
tions of evolutionary biology (Pievani 2012). In contrast to 
the discontinuous shifts of Kuhnian paradigms, Lakatosian 
scientific research programs change in a continuous fash-
ion and allow for amendments and processes of updating 
(Suman 2016). Pievani (2012) also makes the case that the 
ongoing transition from the MS to an EES could be best 
represented as a progressive reformation—and not a blunt 
Fig. 1  Conceptual representation, based on Pigliucci (2009), of the 
continuous expansion of ‘evolutionary theory’ in terms of ideas, 
phenomena studied, and fields of inquiry. The conceptual ele-
ments portrayed in the diagram reflect Pigliucci’s original choices 
(2009)—even though we strongly disagree with the epistemic loca-
tion of Natural History, Paleontology and other entities—, with the 
only exception of disbanding and rewording the pairings of con-
cepts (evolvability and modularity; plasticity and  genetic accommo-
dation). Instead of depicting the alleged consecutive advancement 
using a nested hierarchy of ellipses (see Pigliucci 2009), we chose the 
graphic representation of an endless spiral of expansion. The multi-
colored line demarcates the boundaries of the historically important 
instantiations of evolutionary theory (i.e., Darwinism, Modern Syn-
thesis, Extended Evolutionary Synthesis). The yellow set represents 
Darwin’s theory; the green set is the Modern Synthesis; the blue set 
corresponds to the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis; and the pur-
ple set enclosed in dotted lines hint at possible future expansions of 
evolutionary theory. The relative distance between the elements is 
not intended to reflect closer conceptual ties; likewise, the relative 
order of appearance of the elements throughout the spiral does not 
imply chronological developments. Image conceived by Fátima Sofía 
Ávila-Cascajares and Alejandro Fábregas-Tejeda; image design by 
Casandra Lizbeth Méndez-Martínez, Diana Martínez Almaguer and 
Julio César Montero Rojas (color figure online)
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substitution—of a prior evolutionary research program with 
a different one that displays an extended Neo-Darwinian 
core, surrounded by a brand-new protective belt of epistemic 
assumptions and auxiliary hypotheses with a pluralistic and 
integrative explanatory approach. The core of the evolution-
ary biology SRP known as MS is depicted by Pievani as the 
genetic and populational theory of natural selection; accord-
ingly, three major methodological postulates comprise the 
external protective belt: phyletic gradualism, extrapolation-
ism from microevolution to macroevolution, and stringent 
adaptationism (Pievani 2012; for a contrasting characteriza-
tion, see Futuyma 2015). Pievani therefore thinks that the 
EES entails a steady and irreversible transformation of the 
architecture of the previous SRP (i.e., a new protective belt 
and an expanded core), and not merely a superficial styling 
on marginal points of a hardened structure. In that sense, the 
structure of the new SRP would contain profound conceptual 
novelty and pluralistic frameworks while remaining compat-
ible with the core of the MS (Pievani 2012).
A similar version of that view, which instead portrays 
the EES as an alternative Lakatosian research program 
to the SET—and not the reformation of such theoretical 
assemblage—was expounded and discussed during the 
2016 meeting ‘New trends in evolutionary biology: bio-
logical, philosophical and social science perspectives’ held 
at the Royal Society of London, and is now reaching for 
consensus among the international community of scientists 
and philosophers that support the EES movement. At the 
aforementioned meeting, during the first round table discus-
sion moderated by the British philosopher of science Nancy 
Cartwright (8 November 2016), Kevin Laland stated that, in 
his opinion, the EES is an alternative (and complementary) 
Lakatosian research program to the SET (audio recordings 
of the presentations are available at https ://royal socie ty.org/
scien ce-event s-and-lectu res/2016/11/evolu tiona ry-biolo gy/). 
This is the discursive presentation of the EES that was hinted 
in Laland et al. (2015), and the one that explicitly appears 
in the recently inaugurated website of the EES, linked with 
the project financed by the Templeton Foundation (see http://
exten dedev oluti onary synth esis.com/).
It is important to stress that, for the current state of affairs 
in the plural landscape of evolutionary biology, character-
izing the EES with Lakatosian schemes is not a move free 
of drawbacks. According to the evaluative typology Lakatos 
(1978) proposed for SRPs, a program can be progressive 
during a limited timeframe if it is able to make success-
ful predictions and increase the number of statements and 
hypotheses with empirical content; on the contrary, a pro-
gram can be degenerative if it only resorts to ad hoc explana-
tions to account for novel observations. Notwithstanding that 
apparently clear-cut distinction, Lakatos emphasized that 
tables can be turned at any moment: a successful program 
may start to degenerate and a competing program could 
overcome a rough patch, becoming progressive once again. 
Moreover, at this point it is necessary to remember that the 
methodology proposed by Lakatos is exclusively retrospec-
tive: it provides neither forward-looking assessments of pre-
sent competing scientific research programs, nor delineates 
strong criteria to rationally conduct the business of theory 
appraisal (for an analysis, see Hacking 1979). His friend and 
colleague, Paul Feyerabend, fiercely criticized Lakatosian 
methodology—in the book Against Method (1975)—because 
it ‘could not function as a good device’ for advising on cur-
rent scientific work. For Lakatos himself, the progressive-
ness or degeneracy of a SRP could only be asserted through 
historiographical work; thus, by resorting to Lakatosian 
schemes, the proponents of the EES cannot claim that the 
SET should be abandoned because their conceptual frame-
work is, in some sense, superior (as was hinted in Laland 
et al. 2014; a position that was later changed in Laland et al. 
2015), if they wish to remain congruent with the philo-
sophical standpoint they openly chose. Furthermore, even 
though the entire list of predictions (delineated in Laland 
et al. 2015) set to be tested by the Templeton Foundation’s 
project turned out to be successful, the proponents of the 
EES cannot claim that their research program will entail 
future achievements and that it is progressive (for Lakatos, 
that is something only historians can decide). According to 
Lakatos, successful predictions do not guarantee, by any 
means, future successes: the EES can start in a progressive 
path and end up in disparagement, being overpassed by a 
renewed SET. In Lakatosian terms, then, the EES movement 
could prove to be transitory, and subject to the rhetoric and 
sociological contexts of evolutionary biology that surely will 
unfold in the next few years.
The Modern Synthesis was articulated and elaborated 
around the time a strong and over-arching tradition of phi-
losophy of science (i.e., logical empiricism) was gaining 
ground4 (for historical and philosophical overviews, see 
Smocovitis 1996; Callebaut 2010, respectively). Although 
not mentioned or recognized very often, the architects of 
the  MS and logical empiricists shared epistemological 
commitments (Delisle 2009): ideals of a unified science 
and compact explanatory structures capable of dealing with 
numerous and multifarious phenomena. There are commu-
nicating vessels between this philosophical heritage and 
the interpretations that regard the Extended Evolutionary 
4 In the traditional narratives, it was not until a few decades later 
that what we properly call ‘philosophy of biology’ was born (Palma 
2015). Philosophy of biology integrated aspects, reformulations and 
critiques to the blind spots and flaws of twentieth-century philosophy 
of science—e.g. the rejection to strict determinism, ‘universal laws’ 
and physicalist epistemologies, accepting, instead, probabilistic pre-
dictions and historical explanations (see Mayr 2004)—as well as the 
unique theoretical and empirical developments of a mature biology 
(Palma 2015). For a different and robust historiography on the origins 
of philosophy of biology, see Nicholson and Gawne (2015).
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Synthesis as a unification—a new compact explanatory 
structure—of disparate concepts, puzzling phenomena and 
scientific disciplines, such as the vision portrayed in Fig. 1 
(for a discussion, vide supra). Framing the EES as a per-
sisting Kuhnian paradigm or as an alternative Lakatosian 
research program are not the only possible philosophical 
avenues to think about theoretical change or the possible 
interpretations of what the label ‘Extended Evolutionary 
Synthesis’ stands for5 and what resignifications may entail. 
We think that maybe the right metaphors of scientific change 
are not at play. It is relatively easy to use worn-out notions 
such as ‘paradigm’ or ‘scientific research program’. A big-
ger challenge for philosophers and historians of biology is 
to come up with different metaphors or models of scientific 
change to comprehensively characterize the structure of sci-
entific frameworks. We agree with Love (2010) that there is 
no ‘one and only’ correct way of thinking about evolutionary 
theory (or theories, we may add) and that epistemological 
perspectives should be discussed in a ‘pluralistic stance’ 
(sensu Kellert et al. 2006), gauging the alternatives with its 
advantages, disadvantages, biases and heuristic values. Con-
trary to the pursuit for the hegemonic ascent of a single view 
to apprehend the EES, we prefer alternative images in which 
pluralism can thrive (see Casanueva 2016). In what follows, 
we propose one of such outlooks in order to start the discus-
sion, though we do not claim that it is an unblemished view.
Alternative interpretations of the ‘emerging 
structure’ of the EES
For evolutionary biologists, there is a pervasive tendency to 
think that “evolutionary theory [here referring to the theo-
retical structure or the central tenets of the MS] is a cohesive 
unit, which maintains a single structural packaging of its 
theoretical content” (Love 2013; p. 327; text inside brack-
ets added). On the other hand, many philosophers of biol-
ogy have contended that the MS cannot be represented as a 
single comprehensive scientific theory (e.g., Wassermann 
1981; Burian 1988; Callebaut 2010; Love 2013). Werner 
Callebaut (2010) characterized the ‘evolution of evolution-
ary thinking’, since the onset of the MS, as an open-ended 
dialectical history of simultaneous unifying and disunify-
ing tendencies: this comment bolsters the view that it is 
more suitable to think of the MS as a “flexibly structured 
network of concepts and models” (p. 457) rather than as a 
bona fide theory, as they are usually conceptualized by clas-
sical philosophical traditions. Accordingly, we do not see 
the EES as a single theory or as something akin to a new 
compact explanatory structure revolving around a unified 
core (something Pigliucci 2009, Fig. 1 and the other portray-
als of the EES revised before seem to imply; see also Reiss 
2012). The invocation of spatial containment metaphors to 
depict the EES (remarkably, the image of a nested set of 
ellipses or its variations that presume that what is needed 
to extend the MS/SET is merely to enlarge its conceptual 
bucket) is followed by another unwanted assumption: that 
its theory structure is relatively uncomplicated, consisting of 
an organized system with a central core and some regional 
satellites, although their specifics relations remain unstated 
(Love 2013; see also Love 2017 for other critiques of the 
inadequacy of spatial containment metaphors to characterize 
evolutionary biology).
Alternatively, we think that the mature structure of the 
EES might not be characterized by a new harmonious set of 
perfectly consistent theories (in contrast to what has once 
been claimed for the case of the MS, see Mayr 1963; p. 8). 
Instead, we propose the image of a large network of models 
and interweaved representations that, instantiated in diverse 
practices, are connected and related in multiple ways.6 In 
their review of Pigliucci and Müller (2010a), Handschuh and 
Mitteroecker (2012) informally suggested that the gestation 
and maturation of the EES, in an analogy to the historical 
development of the MS, can follow defined stages: after the 
expansion of the remodeled MS framework by adding con-
cepts of innovative research fields (i.e., the second stage of 
their periodization), a new core, much more diverse and thus 
much looser in interdependency, could be accepted by con-
sensus, “integrating the spectrum of concepts to a weblike 
theoretical network” (p. 19). This view is different from ours 
because we think that the EES could be articulated around 
a paraconsistent network (or group of networks) of evolu-
tionary models, practices and representation systems, with 
edges and nodes that change their position and centrality as a 
consequence of the co-construction and stabilization of facts 
and historical discussions revolving around the epistemic 
goals of evolutionary biology.
Units and goals in the epistemology of the EES
Epistemic goals are complex scientific problems consisting 
of a set of related questions (Brigandt 2010). Ingo Brigandt 
(2010) recognizes these are synonyms to Alan Love’s notion 
of ‘problem agenda’ (see Love 2008, 2010). Love (2010) has 
suggested an “erotetic (pertaining to questioning) structure for 
6 This idea emerged in the context of an academic collaboration with 
Mexican philosopher of science Mario Casanueva López (UAM-Cua-
jimalpa, Mexico).
5 Other possibilities would include conceptualizing the EES, just as 
the MS was conceived in past decades, as a multi-field theory (sensu 
Darden 1986) or, following Wassermann (1981), as a hypertheory 
that subsumes subordinate theories that deal with different but com-
plementary evolutionary mechanisms; for additional discussions, see 
Love (2013, 2017).
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evolutionary theory, which characterizes a synthesis in terms of 
multiple problem agendas exhibiting complex but coordinating 
relationships” (p. 404). Each epistemic goal or problem agenda 
is associated with ‘criteria of adequacy’, which, given current 
empirical and conceptual background knowledge, set stand-
ards for what counts as an adequate solution (i.e., what shape a 
satisfactory explanation has to take), thus forming the overall 
explanans for a particular explanandum (Brigandt 2010). For 
example, an epistemic goal for Evo-Devo (or, as some would 
claim, for contemporary evolutionary biology as a whole) is 
the explanation of evolvability (Wagner 2015; Nuño de la Rosa 
2017) and evolutionary novelties (Brigandt 2010; Brigandt and 
Love 2010, 2012). In contrast, as stated by Pigliucci and Mül-
ler (2010b), a primary goal for an ‘extended synthesis’—and/
or for the EES—is to provide a causal-mechanistic account of 
phenotypic evolution. To be sure, an epistemic goal for the EES 
sensu Laland et al. (2015) is to give a mechanistic explana-
tion of the origin and maintenance of functional and selectable 
phenotypic variation (with its genetic and non-genetic sources). 
Another important epistemic goal for the EES is to understand 
the constructive roles organisms play shaping their own devel-
opment and evolution, and how they change their environments 
(through niche construction and other ontogenetic processes) in 
evolutionary meaningful ways (Laland et al. 2015).
In our scheme, classic Neo-Darwinian elements (e.g., 
natural selection) would not be at the center or core of this 
imagined diffuse network (because it will be devoid of one) 
but would most likely be hubs in a more distributed and 
inclusive conceptual system of connections (for a different 
rebuttal of the idea of ‘core’ in evolutionary biology, see 
Love 2013). In this view, some local regions of the dynami-
cal network(s)7 would be more robust than others, but none 
would remain strictly fixed. Such conceptual architecture of 
the EES would allow explanatory schemes of multilevel cau-
sation (sensu Martínez and Esposito 2014), pertinent to the 
undeniable ontological complexity of biological processes 
(e.g., morphogenesis) that involve systemic properties across 
several levels of organization.
In the current state of affairs, whereas portrayed as a big 
change (see the ‘Yes, urgently’ standpoint in Laland et al. 
2014) or as a more nuanced pluralistic alternative framework 
that hinders the hegemony of the ‘traditional view’ (see Laland 
et al. 2015), the EES is beginning to outline its structure with 
a representation not as tidy as a single ‘theory’, but with a 
much more complex picture bearing resemblance to a diffuse 
net (Fig. 2). The framework of the EES emphasizes the role of 
constructive processes in development and evolution, a broader 
conception of transgenerational inheritance that encompasses 
many forms of non-genetic variation, and reciprocal represen-
tations of causation (Laland et al. 2015). Laland et al. (2015) 
grant that the impetus for an EES is “undoubtedly complex 
and multifaceted” (p. 3); nevertheless, they deemed convenient 
to concentrate their arguments about the incipient structure, 
assumptions and predictions of the EES on insights derived 
mainly from four research areas with convergent themes: in 
their own usage, “developmental plasticity”, “inclusive inherit-
ance”, “niche construction”, and “evolutionary developmental 
biology” (hence leaving out of the account some important 
subjects, such as physiology, that had been already discussed 
under extended evolutionary schemes, see Noble et al. 2014).
There is no question that the paper by Laland et al. (2015) 
was a commendable first effort to construct a coherent structure 
for the EES, since one of the main criticisms it had received by 
then from multiple camps is that the notion of an ‘Extended 
Evolutionary Synthesis’ is just a grandiloquent label with an 
unfathomable common theoretical thread, besides fighting the 
straw-man of gene-centrism (on these points, see the criticism 
of Pievani 2016a). Notwithstanding the importance of their 
meaningful effort, we have detected some misunderstandings 
that arise from their ambiguous usage of ‘structure’, a tricky 
philosophical term. The challenges to the SET accentuated by 
the EES refer to “how evolutionary theory is structured and not 
simply whether more content must be included” (Love 2017; 
p. 161). Thorough analyses of the epistemological aspects of 
science involve making a distinction between the ‘structure’ 
and ‘content’ of theories and conceptual frameworks. Consid-
erations about the structure of theories, for instance, pertain to 
the nature of scientific theories themselves (Love 2010) and 
to questions such as: How is knowledge organized within a 
circumscribed domain called ‘theory X’? Does the organiza-
tion of knowledge of a particular theory resemble other scien-
tific theories? In which ways is different or similar? What are 
the contours of a scientific theory? Should we organize the 
content of theories following certain epistemic ground rules? 
(see Love 2017). For philosophers of science, three families of 
perspectives on the structure of scientific theories are opera-
tive (Winther 2015a): the syntactic view (in which theories 
are conceived as axiomatized collections of sentences, i.e., 
syntactic logical reconstructions), the semantic view (where 
theories are conceived as collections of nonlinguistic models 
open to semantically meaningful mathematical modeling), and 
the pragmatic view (according to which theories are conceived 
as amorphous and complex entities closely tied to function and 
context, consisting variably of sentences, models, exemplars, 
problems, standards, skills, practices and tendencies). Regard-
less of the philosophical standpoint, the issue we want to high-
light is that the content of scientific theories gets organized by 
7 A possibility that may be worth exploring further is that, for a given 
moment in time, there could be more than one topological configura-
tion of the EES existing simultaneously. For Love (2013; p. 332), in 
evolutionary biology we can see a “(…) multiplicity of theory struc-
tures constructed from the heterogeneity of methodological and epis-
temological goals” (italics added); in the future, if the EES reaches 
far-ranging acceptance, we could have many EES structures in the 
cases where distinct situated communities of evolutionary biologists 
follow different epistemic goals.
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scientists and philosophers in epistemic units (e.g., models, 
concepts, exemplars, explanations, problems, practices) that 
relate to each other in defined ways, thereby delineating a 
structure.8 The purported ‘structure’ of the EES in Laland et al. 
(2015) depicts the relations between classic Neo-Darwinian 
evolutionary causes (e.g., natural selection, genetic drift) and 
several additional classes of processes that are newly recog-
nized evolutionary causes (including those that generate novel 
variation, bias selection and contribute to inheritance), without 
making explicit how the content (i.e., processes important for 
biological evolution) should be organized in related epistemic 
units. For a plural conceptual framework such as the EES, the 
ambiguity of Laland and collaborators’ characterization of its 
‘structure’ lies in its uncertainty regarding the organizational 
representation of (the relevant) evolutionary processes—i.e., 
if they are depicted/contained in models, concepts, theories, 
explanations and/or other epistemic units connected in defined 
manners. Thematically expanding an evolutionary framework 
by means of recognizing several additional classes of related 
evolutionary processes does not suffice to understand the 
meaningful changes these new components may bring to its 
conceptual architecture9: the clarification of how knowledge 
about the processes of evolution is organized into distinct and 
connected epistemic units (i.e., how content is structured) is 
needed. We show that in Fig. 3 by projecting in two separate 
but coordinate planes the recently stated ‘structure’ of the EES 
Fig. 2  The recently stated ‘structure’ of the Extended Evolutionary 
Synthesis, redrawn and modified from Laland et  al. (2015), main-
taining the concepts and solid/dotted arrows portrayed there, with 
indication of the interacting ‘processes’ that generate novel variants 
(e.g., genetic change, developmental processes), bias selection (i.e., 
niche construction and developmental bias), modify the frequency 
of heritable variation (i.e., evolutionary forces acting in a popula-
tion genetics context) and contribute to inclusive transgenerational 
inheritance (a broadened conception that includes genetic, epigenetic, 
ecological and cultural inheritance). Concepts shown in red are those 
emphasized and advocated by the EES, but subsumed, disregarded 
or deemed negligible by more traditional perspectives. In their origi-
nal diagram, concepts here written in bold, in our opinion exhibited 
ambiguous meanings produced  by confusions or not sufficiently 
explicit distinctions between epistemic units and the ontology of nat-
ural processes. The peach-colored rectangle demarcates the bounda-
ries of a population of developing organisms. The blue rectangle 
encompasses processes that generate novel variants; the green rectan-
gle encompasses processes that bias selection; the yellowish rectangle 
encompasses processes that modify the frequency of heritable varia-
tion. Finally,  the gray rectangle encompasses processes that contrib-
ute to inclusive transgenerational inheritance (color figure online)
8 Theories can also be epistemic units for wider conceptual frame-
works (e.g. hypertheories, see Wassermann 1981) that embrace sev-
eral complementary theories or models.
9 A quote from Love (2013; p. 328) is insightful in that regard: “(…) 
new findings and conceptual developments may involve the reorgani-
zation or rearrangement of theory components, even if they do not 
‘overthrow’ existing foundations. Part of the call for an EES could 
be a complaint about how evolutionary theory organizes biological 
knowledge and guides inquiry, not simply about whether it contains 
all of the relevant parts”.
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(based on Laland et al. 2015). To the right, one plane that 
accommodates concepts that refer to evolutionary relevant pro-
cesses (i.e., evolutionary causes of phenotypic diversity); to the 
left, a non-historicized space of contemporary subdisciplines 
and evolutionary theories10: models that have explored or have 
been proposed to explain some of the processes portrayed in 
the other plane (i.e., the purported ‘core concepts’ of the EES). 
The clarification of the structure of the EES would require 
further elaboration of how exactly the study and explanation 
of evolutionary processes (from natural selection to niche 
construction and developmental bias) is getting organized 
into distinct epistemic units and how they relate to each other 
(i.e., what is the current topology of the structural network). In 
Fig. 3, the structure of the EES is currently missing but would 
emerge at the interface of the two planes. Our preliminary 
analysis of Laland et al. (2015) hints at an emerging concep-
tual architecture of the EES which resembles a diffuse network 
(or maybe more than one network) of multiple epistemic units 
derived from different biological subdisciplines and evolution-
ary theories/models in complex and pluralistic dialogue, shar-
ing epistemic goals.
It should be stressed that the scientific subdisciplines and 
models [‘Evo-Devo’; ‘developmental plasticity’ (DP)] and 
evolutionary theories [(‘Niche Construction Theory (NCT); 
‘Evolution in 4 Dimensions’ (E4D); ‘Standard Evolution-
ary Theory’ (SET)] at play are not represented unabridged: 
several elements of most of them are missing from the con-
ceptual architecture of the EES (see Laland et al. 2015). 
To give some examples: interpretative mutations (sensu 
Jablonka and Lamb 2014) are not mentioned; construction 
chains, important for depicting causal influences in NCT 
(see Laland and O’Brien 2012), are not formally integrated 
Fig. 3  The recently stated ‘structure’ of the Extended Evolutionary 
Synthesis, based on Laland et  al. (2015), projected with two sepa-
rate but coordinate planes: to the right,  a plane that accommodates 
concepts that refer to evolutionary relevant natural processes (repro-
duced from Fig. 2; ‘Plane 1’); to the left, a non-historicized space of 
contemporary subdisciplines/evolutionary theories that have explored 
or tried to explain some of the concepts depicted in the other plane 
(i.e., the purported core concepts of the EES; ‘Plane 2’). The colored 
rectangles, with the same color code used in Fig. 2, chart correspond-
ences between the two planes: the four kinds of processes depicted 
in the right plane have been addressed by different, often interacting, 
subdisciplines/evolutionary theories. Currently, the structure of the 
EES is missing but would emerge at the interface of the two planes. 
SET standard evolutionary theory, Evo-Devo evolutionary develop-
mental biology, Eco-Evo-Devo ecological evolutionary developmen-
tal biology, NCT niche construction theory, E4D evolution in four 
dimensions (color figure online)
10 We think the notion of ‘evolutionary theories’ in that context is 
adequate. Niche construction theory is the prominent example of one 
(see Odling-Smee et al. 2003; Laland et al. 2016). Eva Jablonka and 
Marion Lamb have also described the general picture of their book 
Evolution in Four Dimensions as a “sort of Darwinian theory (…) 
that sees DNA as a crucial heritable developmental resource, but rec-
ognizes that DNA is not the only resource that contributes to hered-
ity” (Jablonka and Lamb 2007; p. 356; see Jablonka and Lamb 2014 
for a revised edition of the book).
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into the working framework of the EES11; epistasis and 
extinction (important for the defenders of the SET) are being 
overlooked (see the ‘No, All is Well’ stance in Laland et al. 
2014). This could be a reflection of what Ingo Brigandt has 
seen as a key component of explanatory integration: “solv-
ing a complex problem [an epistemic goal] need not require 
the stable synthesis of different biological fields or the devel-
opment of genuine interfield theories, as smaller epistemic 
units [concepts, explanations, methods] from traditional dis-
ciplines can be related solely for the purposes of a specific 
problem” (Brigandt 2010; text inside brackets added). The 
next section of this article deals with what epistemic units 
(sensu Brigandt’s epistemology of explanatory integration) 
of Evo-Devo are present or still missing from the emerging 
architecture of the EES.
How Evo‑Devo and the EES are formally 
related? What key themes of Evo‑Devo 
are not (yet) formally integrated 
into the conceptual foundations of the EES?
In the same way we should be wary of the doubtful charac-
terizations that regard the MS as a single comprehensive sci-
entific theory, we should remain skeptical of the claims that 
depict present Evo-Devo as a single unified theory (see Nuño 
de la Rosa 2014 for a brief analysis). Moreover, in recent 
times, the field has suffered a vertiginous expansion with the 
incorporation of conceptual and technical tools from many 
subdisciplines, including genomics, ecological and quantita-
tive genetics, the study of developmental plasticity, ecology, 
paleontology, cell and systems biology, theoretical biology, 
behavioral sciences, population genetics and a large etcetera 
(Abouheif and Sears 2015; a trend originally identified by 
Müller 2007a). As a consequence, the boundaries of evolu-
tionary developmental biology are becoming blurred and 
harder to demarcate, and so its goals and questions. This is 
one of the reasons why it is not at all clear how Evo-Devo 
should be formally integrated into the current evolutionary 
synthesis12 or into the pluralistic EES.13 Of the different calls 
to ‘extend’ the MS that have appeared in recent years, the 
presence of Evo-Devo (with varying degrees) is, probably, 
the commonest constituent of all (e.g., Pigliucci 2007; Mül-
ler 2007b, 2014; Carroll 2008; Weber 2011), with a shared 
need to explain the nature and origin of organic form (Love 
2017). Despite its epistemic uncertainties, Evo-Devo has 
achieved a great degree of maturity and recently has been 
portrayed as a ‘trading zone’ (sensu Peter Galison) due to the 
complex co-existence of a “variety of disciplines, styles, and 
paradigms negotiating heavily with one another” (Winther 
2015b; p. 459). Given the relentless ‘coming of age’ of the 
discipline, the time is right to start posing questions about its 
formal relationships to the EES: How much of Evo-Devo is 
actually present (integrated or floating isolated) in the cur-
rent characterizations (i.e., Laland et al. 2015) of the EES? Is 
it true that “Evo-Devo shapes the Extended Synthesis”? (as 
claimed in the title of Müller 2014). How the included key 
themes and epistemic units of Evo-Devo are contributing to 
shape and alter the trajectories of that nascent framework? 
Which key themes and epistemic units are foreshadowed or 
plainly absent? How international practicing scientists of the 
burgeoning Evo-Devo community are using (or abstaining to 
use) the framework of the EES in the design of experiments 
and/or in the interpretation of empirical data?
Not long ago, Gerd Müller remarked that it is still early 
to grasp the precise appearance of the EES, but it will surely 
include “an account of the evolution of novelty and com-
plexity, and the dominance of the variation-in-populations 
approach will recede. Such change entails significant shifts 
in theory structure, accounting—among other factors—for 
the dynamics of development, multiple levels of selection, 
different forms of inheritance, and reciprocity between 
environment and organismal activity” (Müller 2014; p. 
121). Laland et al. (2015) asserted clearly the importance 
of developmental constructive processes in evolution, and it 
has been said before that one of the critical aims of the EES 
is to identify and explain the causal forces of developmental 
mechanisms that have an essential role in the evolution of 
organic form (Pigliucci and Müller 2010b; Martínez and 
Esposito 2014). Just by looking at the pronouncements in the 
selected references above, one may argue that Evo-Devo’s 
most simple and fundamental tenet (i.e., knowledge of devel-
opment is mandatory to fully understand evolutionary pro-
cesses; stated in Hall 1992; Wagner 2000), is undeniably 
present in the current state of the EES. But does this mean 
that the notion of ‘constructive development’ (CD; sensu 
Laland et al. 2015) is one of the main contributions of Evo-
Devo to the EES? We regard that view as inaccurate and 
partial. Several elements are encapsulated in the notion of 
CD: non-programmed ontogenies that co-construct its own 
developmental trajectories (internal and external states) by 
means of plastically responding to, integrating and shap-
ing environmental cues with causal parity and reciprocal 
causation. Furthermore, for Laland et al. (2015; p. 6), “the 
11 Although one could interpret Fig.  2 as something akin to a con-
struction chain.
12 For three different accounts of the tensions that exist between Evo-
Devo and the Modern Synthesis, consult Minelli (2010), Laubichler 
(2010), Craig (2015). They address, respectively, the viable possibil-
ity of integration, the insurmountable obstacles for doing so, and the 
possible pluralist co-existence of both as individual conceptual frame-
works in evolutionary biology. Amundson (2005) is a good historical 
complement to these debates.
13 Fusco (2015) places the blame on the flawed and insufficient theo-
retical work being conducted; other scientific or sociohistorical rea-
sons will not be addressed here.
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developing organism cannot be reduced to separable com-
ponents, one of which (e.g., the genome) exerts exclusive 
control over the other (e.g., the phenotype). Rather, causa-
tion also flows back from ‘higher’ (i.e., more complex) levels 
of organismal organization to the genes (e.g., tissue-specific 
regulation of gene expression).” CD does not a assume a 
bijective function (i.e., a  one-to-one correspondence) 
between genotype and phenotype, nor grants causal privi-
lege and programmatic jurisdiction to genes driving indi-
vidual development; instead, the developmental system is 
viewed as responding flexibly and creatively to internal and 
external inputs, through condition-dependent gene expres-
sion, and through physical properties of cells and tissues 
and ‘exploratory behaviors’ of several systems. To say it 
with their adagio: “Organisms are not built from genetic 
‘instructions’ alone, but rather self-assemble using a broad 
variety of inter-dependent resources” (Laland et al. 2015; 
p. 6). Taking those views into account,14 we argue that the 
notion of (constructive) development (as used by Laland 
et al. 2015) cannot be derived entirely from Evo-Devo; it 
stems from many sources, including developmental systems 
theory (Oyama 1986), studies of cognition and behavior (see 
Gottlieb 1992; Oyama et al. 2001), developmental plastic-
ity15 (see West-Eberhard 2003) and, of course, evolutionary 
developmental biology. The preceding statement gains more 
ground when we recognize that the very notion of ‘develop-
ment’ is contentious for developmental biology and Evo-
Devo (see Minelli and Pradeu 2014). We therefore think that 
the concept of CD (crucial for Laland et al. 2015) is not the 
same notion of ‘development’ most Evo-Devo practition-
ers and developmental biologists have in mind (they usually 
harbor a multiplicity of heterogeneous concepts and opera-
tional definitions of development, if one at all; see Pradeu 
et al. 2016). Not many evodevoists conceptualize develop-
ing organisms as hierarchical systems (in which different 
levels of organization interact in complex ways) that result 
from interactive and co-constructive processes and causes 
(e.g., evolutionary, ecological, developmental), and not mere 
products of closed or partially open genetic programs; even 
fewer evodevoists would go as far as to embrace the princi-
ple of causal parity. Likewise, it has been stressed that most 
of contemporary Evo-Devo research is not ‘Devo research’ 
per se, but is focused predominantly on genetics/genomics 
and new sophisticated molecular methods, concealing devel-
opment to the background (Diogo 2016). In the words of 
Armin Moczek (2012), in current Evo-Devo we see “Too 
many genes, too little development” (p. 116).
We now focus our attention to other presently incorpo-
rated and absent epistemic units of Evo-Devo in the EES. 
A recurring theme in Laland et al. (2015) is the attention 
given to the fact that phenotypic variation can be biased by 
the processes and dynamics of development, channeling the 
evolution (i.e., increasing the probability of occurrence) of 
certain functional forms and restricting the possible space 
of realized forms. Developmental bias (e.g., the nonrandom 
numbers of meristic elements in the body plans of metazo-
ans) is, by far, the most frequently deployed epistemic unit of 
Evo-Devo in the discussion of the structure and assumptions 
of the EES in Laland et al. (2015). Another important key 
theme for Evo-Devo, facilitated variation (see Kirschner and 
Gerhart 2005), is used as a conceptual scaffold for explain-
ing the existence of phenotypic variation that is channeled 
and directed toward functional types (developmental bias): 
the ‘core processes’ of development concurrently exhibit 
high robustness and exploratory behaviors that allow them 
to stabilize and select certain states over others (Laland et al. 
2015). Additional key themes of Evo-Devo are marginally 
mentioned throughout the discussion: for instance, we see 
the recognition of the existence of modularity in develop-
mental systems and differential coupling and decoupling of 
phenotypic modules (p. 3); it is mentioned once in the text 
that phenotypic variation is often the result of alterations 
in the timing, location, amount or type of gene products 
brought about by changes in gene regulatory machinery (p. 
3; processes that Wallace Arthur has organized under the 
label ‘developmental repatterning’; see Arthur 2011). The 
important issue of the evolvability of biological systems, 
a fundamental topic for Post-Dahlem evolutionary biology 
(see Wagner 2015), even portrayed by some evodevoists 
as the proper focus of their discipline (see Hendrikse et al. 
2007), appears in the tables and figures of the article, but 
with only one mention in the corpus of the text (Laland 
et al. 2015; p. 3). In summary, Evo-Devo ideas discussed 
in Laland et al. (2015) represent a small fraction of the 
themes and concepts that, throughout recent history, have 
been deemed important or fundamental for the discipline. 
We have prepared a non-exhaustive list of such key themes 
in Table 1. Of all the terms listed in Table 1, only develop-
mental bias, facilitated variation, and to a considerable lesser 
extent, modularity and evolvability were used as epistemic 
14 We have selected, for the consideration of the reader, three addi-
tional fragments of Laland et  al. (2015) where the prominence of 
developmental processes and developmental frameworks is patent: 
“Parent–offspring similarity occurs not only because of transmis-
sion of DNA, but because parents transfer a variety of developmen-
tal resources that enable reconstruction of developmental niches”(p. 
4); “Niche construction also influences ontogeny and constitutes 
an important way in which environmental factors are incorporated 
into normal development, sometimes to become as dependable as 
genomic factors” (p. 4); “Too much causal significance is afforded to 
genes and selection, and not enough to the developmental processes 
that create novel variants, contribute to heredity, generate adaptive fit, 
and thereby direct the course of evolution” (p. 6).
15 Laland and collaborators consider that Evo-Devo is in no posi-
tion to subsume or engulf the study of developmental plasticity (see 
Laland et al. 2015).
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units by Laland et al. (2015) to outline the structure and 
assumptions of the EES.16 
The potential for including more themes of evolutionary 
developmental biology and developmental evolution to the 
EES is enormous. Right now, we see the sum of the epis-
temic units of Evo-Devo incorporated in the EES as an ‘early 
ontogenetic stage’ with multiple open developmental tra-
jectories. In a forthcoming, mature EES, for example, epis-
temic units of Evo-Devo (e.g., evolvability, developmental 
bias, modularity, but also generative entrenchment, genetic 
tool-kit, GRN evolution, ChINs, DPMs) could be deployed, 
alongside epistemic units pertaining to niche construction 
theory and the views of inclusive inheritance and multilevel 
causation, to generate integrative explanatory frameworks 
that tackle macroevolutionary problems such as the evolu-
tion and diversification of bilaterian body plans in the early 
Cambrian (i.e., the so-called ‘Cambrian Explosion’). A 
good example of what we think are steps in that direction 
is the recent framework proposed by Laubichler and Renn 
(2015) to integrate regulatory networks and niche construc-
tion, designed to be equally applicable to cases of biologi-
cal, social and cultural evolution. The semantic field of the 
concept of CD, as currently used in the EES (Laland et al. 
2015), could also be enriched by augmenting the epistemic 
units derived from Evo-Devo, also following Laubichler 
and Renn (2015). Finally, proposals for a ‘theory of theory 
integration’ sensu Laubichler et al. (2018) could be con-
trasted with our philosophical treatment of explanatory and 
theoretical integration in the EES—based on the works of 
Brigandt and Love—to foster additional discussions.
Concluding remarks
We do not interpret the EES as a continuous add-on exten-
sion of the SET, where whole new fields, concepts, models 
and theories are coalescing around a Neo-Darwinian core. 
Moreover, we do not consider that the EES looks like a 
bona fide extension at all, as its name implies. It seems that 
Table 1  A non-exhaustive list of key themes that have been deemed important or fundamental at some point of the history of the field of Evo-
Devo
According to some authors, each cell in the table is a putative epistemic unit of Evo-Devo (although we recognize some of them overlap). Bold 
text highlights the epistemic units that were consistently used in Laland et al. (2015)
Developmental bias/developmental con-
straint (Martínez 2009; Caponi 2012; Müller 
2014)
Facilitated variation (Kirschner and Gerhart 
2005; Müller 2014)
Evolvability (Hendrikse et al. 2007; Müller 
2007b; Wagner 2015)
Phenotypic plasticity (West-Eberhard 2003; 
Sommer 2009)
Modularity (von Dassow and Munro 1999; 
Callebaut and Rasskin-Gutman 2005; Müller 
2014)
Developmental symbiosis (Gilbert et al. 2015)
Homology (Wagner 2014)/homology thinking 
(Wagner 2016)
Deep homology (Shubin et al. 2009; Held 
2017)
Character identity networks (ChINs; Wagner 
2007, 2014)
Pleiotropy (Pavličev and Wagner 2012) Robustness (Bateson and Gluckman 2011) Genetic tool-kit (Carroll et al. 2001; Wilkins 
2014)
Developmental repatterning (Arthur 2011) Heterochrony (Raff and Wray 1989; McKinney 
and McNamara 1991)
Gene regulatory network evolution (Davidson 
2006; Carroll 2008; Rebeiz et al. 2015)
Innovation triad (origination, innovation, nov-
elty; Müller and Newman 2005)
Epigenetic innovation (Müller 2014) Dynamical patterning modules (DPMs; New-
man and Bhat 2009)
Generic self-organizing properties of develop-
mental systems (Newman 2003)
Body plan (Arthur 1997; Willmore 2012) Developmental system drift (True and Haag 
2001; Müller 2014)
Phylotypic stage/developmental hourglass (Irie 
and Kuratani 2014; Wagner 2015)
Gene co-option (Arthur 2002) Internal selection (Arthur 2002; Caponi 2012)
Emergence (Müller 2007b) Generative entrenchment/burden (Arthur 2002) Organization (Müller 2007b)
16 Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb (pers. comm, July 2017) raised 
the concern that, by focusing on “just one paper”, we may be act-
ing uncharitable or unfairly to gauge the contributions of Evo-Devo 
(or of any other research field) to the EES; that to settle the mat-
ter of the relative contributions of different fields of research to the 
structure of the EES, we should wait for a full-length exposition, 
similar to Huxley’s 1942 book, to appear. Although we agree with 
them (and encourage them to take up to task to write such book) in 
the sense that our philosophical analysis about the structure of the 
EES is preliminary and somewhat sketchy, we need to stress that it 
is just a response to one of the objectives laid out explicitly in Laland 
et  al. (2015: p. 3): “Our objective here is to add substance to these 
debates by providing a clear statement of the structure, assumptions 
and predictions of the EES that is useful to both enthusiasts and skep-
tics, allowing its status as an alternative conceptual framework to be 
evaluated”. We shall add that theory presentations (see Griesemer 
1984) are not philosophically innocuous as they reflect how scientists 
use their frameworks in practice and further demonstrate “how dif-
ferent structures are adopted to achieve specific methodological and 
epistemological goals in evolutionary theory” (Love 2017; p. 161) by 
means of idealizing some features while ignoring or concealing to the 
background other properties or variables of the systems under scru-
tiny (see also Love 2013).
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only specific epistemic units, derived from Evo-Devo, niche 
construction theory, the study of developmental plasticity, 
Jablonka and Lamb’s ‘evolution in four dimensions’ frame-
work and certain elements of the SET, are being deployed by 
the proponents of the EES to outline its structure (see Laland 
et al. 2015). In the alternative image we have presented here, 
the EES could be articulated around a non-static network (or 
networks, perhaps) of evolutionary models, practices and 
representation systems, with edges and nodes that change 
their position and centrality following the developments of 
evolutionary biology and allied scientific disciplines. We 
further propose that the cohesive factor that connects these 
heterogeneous epistemic units is a set of shared epistemic 
goals—in particular, an understanding and acceptance of 
the constructive roles organisms play in shaping their own 
development and in changing their environments in evolu-
tionary meaningful ways. We are aware that a challenge for 
the future will be to define with precision what constitutes 
an epistemic unit of the emerging EES (i.e., which criteria 
should be used to delimit the nodes of the network), if we 
want to move beyond philosophical abstraction and start 
engaging with the actual problems addressed by evolution-
ary biologists. While that philosophical work is underway, 
we also want to invite (other) philosophers of science and 
evolutionary biologists (especially Evo-Devo practitioners) 
to further suggest how Evo-Devo concepts and themes can 
be used as epistemic units for the consolidation of a plural-
istic and integrative EES. Finally, we want to stress that, 
beyond worn-out Kuhnian or Lakatosian schemes, differ-
ent philosophical insights are needed to better understand 
the interdisciplinary reconfiguration of evolutionary theo-
ries that are also opening to different fields of inquiry in the 
social and human sciences (for instance, a potential dialogue 
with anthropology; see Ingold 2018; pp. 104–105: see also 
Fuentes 2016). To better understand the emerging structure 
and the crucially important evolutionary processes empha-
sized by the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, let’s not settle 
for ready-made philosophical solutions.
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